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Uganda Under a Museveni Regime

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An Intelligence Assessment

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*ALA 86-10008
February 1986*

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Uganda Under a Museveni Regime

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An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by [redacted]
Office of African and Latin American Analysis.

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[redacted]
[redacted] It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. [redacted]

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA [redacted]
[redacted]

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Uganda Under a
Museveni Regime

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Scope Note

National Resistance Army insurgents led by Yoweri Museveni ousted Gen. Tito Okello from power on 24 January 1986. This assessment speculates, on the policies and characteristics that a Museveni government is likely to have and on their implications for US interests in the region.

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**Uganda Under a
Museveni Regime**

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Key Judgments*Information available
as of 29 January 1986
was used in this report.*

Yoweri Museveni is an assertive nationalist who, in our view, is likely to pursue an activist, nonaligned, and opportunistic foreign policy. At least initially, he will be willing to maintain dialogue with and accept assistance from almost any source, and he will sustain his thus far successful regional diplomacy, which already has generated support from Kenya, Tanzania, Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi. Museveni will actively court donors to finance a program of economic and social reconstruction and development, but, given his concern about subservience to outside influences, we believe he will strive to avoid dependence on any external source of assistance.

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In our judgment, Museveni's government ultimately will be largely civilian and Bantu—Uganda's largest ethnic grouping. Museveni himself is an Ankole, a Bantu tribe that comprises about 8 percent of the population. We believe that Museveni probably will be more responsible than his predecessors, but that ethnic hatreds and economic disarray will greatly complicate Museveni's central objectives of an ethnically integrated and disciplined Army and an extensive, effective social service system. Museveni has made it plain that elections are not a top priority, and it is unlikely that they will be held for several years, in our view.

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Museveni almost certainly will try to make good on his pledge to punish those guilty of human rights violations under the governments of former Presidents Idi Amin, Milton Obote, and General Okello. We believe that, while he will work to reduce similar abuses under his administration, it is nearly certain the country will continue to be troubled by serious human rights problems, given Uganda's long and embittered history.

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Museveni will be hard pressed to avoid a de facto partition of the country between the Nilotic tribes in the north and the ethnically Bantu south. Indeed, the stage is set for civil war between his predominantly southern forces and northern Ugandans who have dominated the country since independence. In our view, Museveni is likely to face attacks from remnants of Okello's forces, and some of Museveni's advisers probably will urge him to strike quickly against the north to settle old tribal scores and achieve total military victory.

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We also believe that the several thousand former Idi Amin soldiers from the West Nile region whom Okello recruited into his army in late 1985 will be even more ill disposed toward Museveni's government than Okello's

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fellow Acholi tribesmen. Hundreds of the West Nilers deserted in disgust and returned home with their weapons when Okello signed a short-lived December 1985 peace accord with Museveni. The West Nilers had borne the brunt of the fight against Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA), and many felt they had been sold out, according to the US Embassy. [REDACTED]

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We believe, nonetheless, that Museveni will not seek immediate control of the north. His slow, steady consolidation of power in the rebel-held southwest since June 1985, his often-stated intent to rehabilitate war-ravaged areas, and his army's small size all suggest that the insurgent leader's first priority is to consolidate his control over the Bantu south, where the seat of government and most of Uganda's natural resources, infrastructure, and population lie. [REDACTED]

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In our judgment, Museveni's movement has superior leadership, better troops, and much more popular support than did Okello's regime. We believe that Museveni is unlikely to be displaced by Okello or any other northern leader in the near term. Although Museveni is sensitive to Uganda's ethnic diversity, the country's tribal and regional cleavages run deep, and he will have difficulty balancing special interests and insuring that his policies are implemented. [REDACTED]

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If Museveni begins to feel trapped by the pressures of a northern rebellion and economic collapse, we believe there is a possibility he might veer quickly toward radical states and authoritarian behavior. The survivability of his government would take precedence over all other considerations and make Museveni susceptible to potential offers of Libyan or Soviet military assistance. Virtually all of his predecessors have toyed with this option, and Museveni himself has sought Libyan assistance when Western countries refused aid. [REDACTED]

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A Museveni government, in our view, will affect US interests primarily in the areas of human rights, in the continuing opportunities that exist for meddling by the Libyans and the Soviets, and in the possibility that a spillover of civil war in Uganda would harm US friends in the region. Qadhafi has longstanding contacts with both Museveni's movement and

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leaders of the West Nile faction. Either side could be tempted to grant Libya significant influence in exchange for military and financial assistance. A full-scale civil war also would generate large numbers of refugees who would pour into neighboring states with close ties to the United States such as Kenya, Zaire, and Sudan. This, in turn, would place additional strains on these governments and prompt requests for more US aid.

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**Uganda Under a
Museveni Regime**

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Introduction

The peace agreement between the National Resistance Movement (NRM) led by Yoweri Museveni and the government of Gen. Tito Okello reached in Nairobi on 17 December 1985 collapsed on 24 January as Museveni's forces attacked Kampala, and Okello's undisciplined troops fled the capital after fierce fighting. The mainstay of Okello's brutal and disorganized army, which continued to rape and pillage during its return to the north, is his fellow Acholi tribesmen. Many of these troops are now in their northern tribal homeland, where Okello had been stockpiling arms and ammunition since November.

In sharp contrast to previous Ugandan governments, both Museveni and his armed forces consistently exhibited respect for human rights and the rule of law during the insurgency's five-year existence, and their conduct since taking power has remained responsible and humane. This paper assesses the likely direction Museveni's fledgling government will take.

A Museveni Government

Museveni will move quickly to establish a predominantly Bantu government, in our view. The NRM is composed overwhelmingly of Bantus, and Museveni is an ethnic Ankole, one of Uganda's 16 Bantu tribes that comprise nearly two-thirds of the population.

although most of Museveni's troops are Baganda—Uganda's largest ethnic group comprising about 18 percent of the population—only a few of his senior military officials are from that Bantu tribe. We expect Museveni to attempt to redress this imbalance in structuring his new government to reduce grumbling within his armed forces and to solidify his credentials in Baganda areas that have recently come under his control.

Most officials of Museveni's interim administration for areas under his control in the southwest are Bantus, and

Museveni's central political objective is to break the repressive rule of northern ethnic groups that has characterized all Ugandan governments since independence in 1962. NRM negotiators at the Nairobi peace talks consistently stated that the government and the military should reflect ethnic realities.

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We believe that, unlike the situation that prevailed in General Okello's government, most senior officials in a Museveni administration will be civilians. Indeed, most officials in Museveni's interim southwest administration and the first persons named to his Cabinet in Kampala are civilians, according to the US Embassy in Kampala. Museveni has long publicly stressed the need to curb the role and size of the military in Uganda;

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Museveni, however, is unlikely to sanction elections for several years, in our view. He has referred publicly on numerous occasions to the rigged elections of December 1980 when Milton Obote was elected President and Obote's Ugandan People's Congress (UPC) obtained a parliamentary majority with Tanzanian backing.¹ In a letter addressed to a senior US official in September 1984 in which Museveni sought support for the NRM and outlined his objectives for a post-Obote government, Museveni made no mention of future elections. Museveni's book, *Selected Articles on the Uganda Resistance War*, published in late 1985, makes only a glancing reference to the desirability of national elections after he takes power.

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
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Figure 1
Ethnic Groups in Uganda



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Moreover, as an indication of Museveni's priorities, the NRM position paper at the Nairobi negotiations listed the holding of "a free and fair election under the new constitution" as the 13th among 21 points to be negotiated with the Okello government, [redacted]

We believe Museveni is far more likely to institute a single-party government based on the NRM and his former Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM), which ran in the fraudulent 1980 elections, than he is to favor the establishment of a genuine multiparty democracy. His book makes no mention of political parties, and the NRM's position paper was silent on the question of political parties. [redacted]

[redacted] Museveni also has publicly criticized Uganda's established political parties for cooperating with the Okello government. [redacted]

Museveni, in our view, will purge the national Army and security forces of former Amin, Obote, and Okello backers, as well as place his supporters in important positions outside Kampala. Museveni has publicly stated he will verify the loyalty of Ugandan civil servants, and we believe that he will appoint many new district officers, rural development officials, postal employees, and customs officials. The rebel leader also has announced his intention to strengthen local administrative control by creating "people's committees" to administer justice, combat corruption, and "above all" to serve as political forums for local and national issues. [redacted]

The US Embassy in Kampala [redacted] reported that Museveni had difficulty persuading senior officers of his own National Resistance Army (NRA) to continue the peace negotiations in Nairobi, as some of them initially insisted that the war be pursued. A senior official in the Okello government told the US Embassy that, after the accord was signed, Museveni still had trouble defending it to some of his senior military commanders. [redacted]

Museveni may have had some difficulty persuading his commanders that the agreement was in the NRA's interest, although the assault on Kampala on 24 January suggests that Museveni may simply have floated stories of internal NRA dissension to disguise troop movements and other preparations for the attack on the capital. We believe it likely that some of his hardline adherents are urging him to begin immediately to subjugate Uganda's northern Nilotic tribes, which are widely resented for their roughshod treatment of the Bantu south for the past 20 years. [redacted]

We believe that, despite the pressure to move quickly against the north, Museveni will strive first to consolidate control over the south, devoting some months to this task. We expect that the following factors will make Museveni cautious:

- The NRA totals no more than 6,000 trained soldiers, according to a senior US official in Kampala, and NRA soldiers with combat experience number only about 3,500, [redacted]. The remnants of Okello's army of northerners probably number in the thousands, and, though undisciplined and ill trained, would be fighting in home tribal areas. [redacted]
- Unlike Okello, Obote, and Amin—each of whom was a northerner trying to exercise control over a country whose natural resources, population centers, and seat of government lie in the south—Museveni and the vast majority of his followers are southerners, and they do not have to subdue hostile tribal territory to seize national political and economic power.

- Museveni's leadership of his five-year-old insurgency suggests to us that he understands the political and military benefits of patience. He moved slowly and deliberately to expand and consolidate his sway

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The National Resistance Army (NRA)

The National Resistance Army (NRA) is the military wing of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) led by former Defense Minister Museveni. Composed largely of the southern Bantu Ankole and Baganda ethnic groups, the NRA has established the first southern-dominated regime in Kampala since Uganda's independence in 1962. []

The NRA began guerrilla warfare in February 1981 and successfully used hit-and-run tactics to inflict high casualties on and capture arms from the government. The NRA has approximately 3,500 hardened veterans, but its ranks have swollen by several thousand new recruits since the July 1985 coup that toppled President Obote; the total number of trained NRA soldiers is probably 5,000 to 6,000, according to US officials in Kampala. New recruits have come primarily from rebel-held areas of southwestern Uganda and consist of young volunteers, deserters from Okello's army, and returning refugees from Rwanda and Zaire []

The NRA is armed primarily with captured small arms, mortars, artillery pieces, anti-aircraft guns, and military vehicles. []

The NRA's main strengths are its leadership, discipline, and popularity among the population under its control [] *Its morale is high. In sharp contrast to Okello's troops, who routinely murder, loot, and rape, the NRA has consistently avoided brutalizing the population and generally has apologized and compensated civilians for losses suffered during insurgent operations.* []

over areas under NRA control in regions of Uganda that were friendly to him. He is unlikely to change his risk-avoidance behavior in areas known to be hostile to him.

- Museveni's public program of priorities designates the "rehabilitation of war-ravaged areas" as one of his prime concerns. The large majority of such areas are in Museveni's Bantu south and in Obote's Langi tribal homeland in north-central Uganda. []

In sum, we believe that Uganda is in practice likely to become a partitioned state, and that Museveni's control over much of the north is apt to be nominal at best. []

Eventually, however, we believe Museveni will move to assert his authority over the entire country, triggering major violence and perhaps a full-scale civil war. In our view, northern attacks on southern installations or northern efforts to court foreign assistance would impel Museveni to accelerate his campaign against the north. []

Museveni's Domestic Program

Aside from consolidating power, we believe Museveni's top domestic priority will be economic reconstruction and development. In a letter to a senior US official in September 1984, Museveni stressed the need to achieve an economic base to finance a program to eliminate disease, malnourishment, and illiteracy; Museveni's book and his public pronouncements since taking power echo these themes. He claimed publicly last November that he was establishing an interim administration in the southwest in order to provide essential social services. [] Museveni's administration has worked effectively. []

Museveni, however, has inherited an economy in shambles, according to US Embassy reporting. In December 1985, the Okello government had less than a month's worth of foreign exchange reserves, the unofficial exchange rate of approximately 2,400 Ugandan shillings to the dollar was almost three times the official rate, and both imports and exports were at a standstill. Donor assistance had come to a halt as public disorder and lawlessness—much of it committed by Okello's army against the civilian population—stopped foreign aid deliveries and prompted most foreign technical advisers to leave. We believe it will take several years before Museveni can restore even basic social services to much of the country. Given Uganda's dire economic straits, Museveni probably will seek economic assistance from almost any outside source. []

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In our judgment, Museveni is likely to be generally pragmatic in dealing with Uganda's serious economic problems. Though formerly an ardent advocate of Marxism as a student at the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania in the late 1960s, Museveni has moderated his rhetoric and views over the years, and has not publicly identified the NRM with any ideology. Museveni advocates a "mixed economy" for Uganda, and stresses in his book the importance of the country's becoming economically self-sufficient, saying "we ought not to care whether this is done by capitalist or socialist means, as long as it is done." Museveni adds that Uganda's economy should be tilted toward the private sector, however, because "nationalized projects have a tendency toward inefficiency," noting that some so-called African socialist countries had made many errors in this regard. Despite this emphasis on private enterprise, Museveni's book notes that his government will take part in "selected fulcrum-like sectors" such as import-export licensing, banking, and in the ownership of basic industries in order to guide the economy as a whole. Museveni has reiterated these points publicly on taking power. [redacted]

Although Museveni appears open to Western economic and political models, his rhetoric is still sprinkled with the socialist jargon he acquired in his student days. For example, Museveni gave both Marxist-sounding titles—national political commissar—and more Western designators—administrator—to members of his interim administration in the southwest. [redacted]

While many senior NRM officials are westward leaning [redacted] a broader political spectrum may exist at lower levels. The US Embassy in Kampala commented that Museveni's interim southwest administration consists of a curious blend of the traditional and the radical. Some of its officials clearly have Marxist credentials while others are avowedly pro-Western, including a few members of Uganda's old tribal monarchies. The same mix of political orientations characterizes senior NRM officialdom outside the southwest. The US Embassy has expressed some concern that NRA soldiers may be more "statist" and prone to leftist ideology than the NRM's civilian politicians, but we cannot yet discern

[redacted] any ideological pattern in the political inclinations of NRA soldiers in the field. [redacted]

In the political arena, we believe Museveni probably will try to make good on his repeated pledge to punish those guilty of human rights violations. He and his associates have long been adamant [redacted] that guilty individuals from the Amin and Obote eras as well as from the Okello government should pay for their crimes. [redacted]

[redacted] Museveni's NRA has consistently displayed discipline and restraint compared to Okello's army, which has routinely preyed on the population. According to the US Embassy in Kampala, the responsible conduct of Museveni's forces has increased their popularity in areas under NRA control. Museveni also probably believes that his emphasis on human rights will boost his standing with donor countries, making economic assistance more likely. [redacted]

Even with the best of intentions, however, significant human rights abuses probably will continue, especially in the settling of old tribal scores. Uganda's history of tribal enmity is deeply rooted, and, because the NRA's control of the country is limited, many instances of tribal retribution will take place, in our judgment. We believe, nevertheless, that Museveni is making genuine efforts to curb and prosecute human rights abuses, and that his government is more sensitive and responsive to the views of the international community than the Okello regime. We believe he will work to strengthen the rule of law and to control internal security authorities. [redacted]

Museveni's Foreign Policy

Museveni probably will pursue an activist foreign policy that is nonaligned and opportunistic, in our view. We believe that, at least initially, he will be open to a dialogue with almost any state in the hope of eliciting assistance for his fledgling government. Museveni explicitly states in his book that "we should always maintain an independent line in economics,

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**Biographic Sketches of Senior
NRM Personalities^a**
Eriya Kategaya

Museveni's second in command . . . often point of contact for Western officials and journalists . . . a lawyer with moderate political beliefs . . . like Museveni, an Ankole.

Haji Musa Kigongo

Chief administrator of NRM's interim southwest administration . . . a Muganda Muslim . . . unsuccessful parliamentary candidate for Museveni's Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) in 1980 elections . . . loyalty unquestioned.

Dr. Samson Kisekka

A Muganda in his seventies, who became NRM Interim Coordinator (Museveni's main adviser on political affairs) in January 1985 . . . medical doctor . . . served in first Obote government as Health and Works Minister from 1964 to 1966.

Matthew Rukikaire

Politically active since early 1960s when he was forced out of Obote's Ugandan People's Congress because of clashes with the party's radical youth wing . . . chairman of NRM's Nairobi-based foreign relations committee from 1982 to 1986 . . . articulate [redacted] Bantu interlocutor.

Ali Kirunda-Kivijinja

Finance Commissioner in Museveni's interim southwest administration . . . longstanding radical leftist with known Soviet and Chinese ties . . . unsuccessful UPM parliamentary candidate in 1980 . . . a Musoga Muslim.

John Kazzora

Able lawyer and wealthy businessman related to Museveni by marriage . . . NRM political adviser for years . . . pro-West . . . spent most of the 1970s in Nairobi and London . . . an Ankole.

politics, culture, and foreign relations. We should judge friend or foe according to how they relate to our own interests irrespective of the social systems obtaining in the various countries." The only countries with which Museveni has stated he will not deal are South Africa and Israel. [redacted]

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Museveni is apt to be especially active in regional affairs. During the latter half of 1985, he zealously cultivated relations with Uganda's neighbors, Kenya, Tanzania, Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi, [redacted]

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Museveni does not appear to have close ties to any Western state, except perhaps Sweden, where he sent his wife and children in 1984 for security reasons. His relations with the British have been particularly poor,

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[redacted] The US Embassy reports that, in his first meeting with a senior British diplomat after taking power, Museveni was sharply critical of the United Kingdom's silence about human rights violations of previous Ugandan governments. [redacted]

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Since mid-1984, Museveni has made modest efforts to build bridges to the United States. In addition to the conciliatory letter that he wrote to a senior US official in 1984, Museveni dispatched an emissary to the US Embassy in Nairobi in August 1985 to seek military and economic assistance, and senior NRM officials have sought appointments with US officials. The emissary maintained that Museveni wanted to forge close relations with the United States, and we believe other NRM representatives probably will echo this theme in discussions with US officials. Museveni's initial meeting with the US Ambassador in Kampala after taking power was friendly and productive, but we have no clear or sustained evidence that Museveni wants close relations with the United States, and we believe it likely that Museveni views the United States more as a donor than as a friend. [redacted]

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Similarly, however, we have no recent evidence to suggest that Museveni is predisposed toward close relations with the Soviet Union, or that he tried to obtain Soviet backing against the Okello government. Indeed, the absence of reporting on attempts by Museveni to court the Soviet Bloc is particularly noteworthy because Museveni has approached almost everyone else on the geopolitical spectrum, ranging from Libya to the United States and the United Kingdom. We judge, nonetheless, that Museveni probably would accept Soviet economic and military assistance if offered—and that he would actively seek it if he felt it necessary to safeguard the viability of his regime. [REDACTED]

US Ambassador in Kampala that he had met with Qadhafi and sought aid, but only because he was “propelled by our circumstances.” [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] We believe the NRA has received at least nominal Libyan military assistance despite the frequent, public, and categorical denials of NRM officials, including Museveni himself. [REDACTED]

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In our judgment, Museveni probably regards Libyan assistance as a temporary expedient. Museveni is wary of Libya’s connections with Uganda’s Muslim north and the followers of former President Amin,

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[REDACTED] Qadhafi provided substantial assistance to Amin’s government, and, in our view, Museveni probably distrusts the Libyan leader who supported a brutal dictatorship that abused Museveni’s Bantu south, and who once suspended aid to the NRA. [REDACTED]

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Outlook

Museveni’s government is beset by numerous intractable problems: an economy on its knees after years of civil strife, corruption, and mismanagement; a society torn by longstanding ethnic hatreds and atrocities; and a fragile internal security situation complicated by widespread availability of weapons and ammunition. In our judgment, Museveni’s elevation to power has set the stage for a civil war between his predominantly southern forces and the disparate northern factions that have dominated the country since independence. [REDACTED]

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Some embittered Acholi military leaders who have retreated to their tribal homeland probably have already begun plotting a return to power. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] prior to Okello’s ouster, the Acholi shipped substantial quantities of weapons, ammunition, and fuel to their tribal capital

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Museveni [REDACTED] had at least sporadic contact with the Libyans for at least the last five years. In 1981, he unsuccessfully approached the United States, the United Kingdom, and Kenya for military assistance, according to a senior US official. He then turned to Libya and received modest military assistance through 1982, when the Libyans suspended aid, perhaps after deciding that Museveni was not making enough progress. [REDACTED]

The Libyans apparently renewed assistance to Museveni in late 1985. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Museveni also told the

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***Museveni's Critical Challenge: How To Deal
With the North—Signs To Watch***

Several developments will indicate, in our view, the extent to which Museveni strives to reach accommodation instead of confrontation with the northern tribes:

- *Formation of an ethnically balanced national government and army.*
- *Governmental appointments that reflect regional and ethnic interests.*
- *Evenhanded and judicial prosecution of human rights violators.*
- *Minimal national—that is, southern—governmental presence in the north.*
- *Fair distribution of donor aid and development projects among regions.*
- *National conference of regional leaders to draft new constitution and economic development plan for the country as a whole.* []

If Museveni pursues these policies of reconciliation, we believe the chances of regional, ethnic violence disintegrating into civil war will decrease. []

of Gulu in northern Uganda, probably for use in a protracted war with the NRA or as protection against former Amin soldiers from the West Nile region.

[]

West Nile tribesmen recruited into Okello's army seem even less likely to accept Museveni's government peacefully. We believe many of them also will be hostile to the Acholi, whom they regard as having sold out to the NRM in concluding the 17 December peace accord, according to the US Embassy []

[] In the second half of 1985, the West Nilers carried the brunt of fighting against the NRA, and the US Embassy in Kampala reported that many of them, on learning that a peace agreement had been concluded, returned home with their weapons.

[]

In sum, we believe that Uganda's ethnic and regional divisions have become sharper, and Museveni is not likely to be able to narrow these deep fissures. A civil war—perhaps even a three-sided one—is likely, in our view. []

The extent and timing of violence will depend in large measure on the manner in which Museveni tries to exercise control over the north and the degree to which northerners force Museveni's hand by attacking southern targets. In the near term, Museveni's military pragmatism, his demonstrated patience in the pursuit of political objectives, and the major task of economic rehabilitation that confronts his regime in the south indicate that he probably will not make an all-out immediate effort to subdue the north. We believe that consolidation of his rule in the south will be Museveni's major objective for some months. Ultimately, however, we judge that he will move to assert his control over the entire country, despite the strong prospect of considerable violent opposition from the northern tribes. []

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In our judgment, the probable upcoming civil war will undermine Museveni's plans for economic development, drain his support in the war-weary south, and make him increasingly open to radical domestic solutions and susceptible to overtures of military assistance from Libya or the Soviet Union, if they are offered. We believe that over time Museveni will be hard pressed to make good on his pledges of economic reconstruction and respect for human rights, as prosecuting the war against the north becomes the focus of his attention. In sum, a Museveni government may herald the end of northern domination, but it is unlikely to bring peace to Uganda. []

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Implications for the United States and the West

A full-scale civil war in Uganda would have several negative consequences for friends of the United States in neighboring states. Ugandan refugees probably would pour into Kenya, Zaire, and Sudan, placing additional economic and political strains on these countries and generating substantial aid requests from them to the United States and other friendly donors. Diplomatic representatives in Kampala from Kenya, Zaire, Sudan, and Egypt have already approached the US Ambassador there to express their profound concern about Uganda's instability and their fears that Libyan, Soviet, or Ethiopian influence will take root if Uganda fails to achieve internal peace. We believe that in a close struggle either the NRA or the West

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Nile troops could be tempted to grant Libya significant influence in Uganda in exchange for support on the battlefield. Such a Libyan presence could be exploited by Qadhafi to increase his harassment of Zairian President Mobutu and to pressure Kenyan President Moi and smaller regional states like Burundi and Rwanda. In our view, Soviet or Ethiopian meddling is less likely, but either country could be tempted to use Uganda as a platform from which to undermine the stability of Zaire or Kenya. [REDACTED]

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We believe Museveni will try to convince the United States and other Western countries that his government represents a distinct improvement over the abysmal human rights record of his predecessors. His failure to achieve and demonstrate such improvement not only would undermine his administration from within, but would also almost certainly endanger Western assistance, virtually all of which has been suspended in the wake of Uganda's unsettled security situation and its pattern of flagrant human rights violations. If Museveni judges that the West is not being responsive to his efforts, we believe he will not hesitate to court additional Libyan, Soviet, or other radical support for his government. [REDACTED]

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We believe Museveni would respond to any approach that combined intellectual appeals with respect for his personal integrity, past achievements, and power. He would have to be convinced that offers of help are not based on the assumption that he can be bought. [REDACTED]

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